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Abstract
We describe a method to produce a network where cur-
rent methods such as DeepFool have great difficulty produc-
ing adversarial samples. Our construction suggests some
insights into how deep networks work. We provide a rea-
sonable analyses that our construction is difficult to defeat,
and show experimentally that our method is hard to defeat
with both Type I and Type II attacks using several standard
networks and datasets. This SafetyNet architecture is used
to an important and novel application SceneProof, which
can reliably detect whether an image is a picture of a real
scene or not. SceneProof applies to images captured with
depth maps (RGBD images) and checks if a pair of image
and depth map is consistent. It relies on the relative dif-
ficulty of producing naturalistic depth maps for images in
post processing. We demonstrate that our SafetyNet is ro-
bust to adversarial examples built from currently known at-
tacking approaches.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples are images with tiny, impercep-
tible perturbations that fool a classifier into predicting the
wrong labels with high confidence. x denotes the input to
some classifier, which is a natural example and has label
l. A variety of constructions [9, 14, 20, 25] can generate
an adversarial example a(x) to make the classifier label it
m 6= l. This is interesting, because ||a(x)− x ||2 is so small
that we would expect a(x) to be labelled l.
Adversarial examples are a persistent problem of clas-
sification neural networks, and of many other classifica-
tion schemes. Adversarial examples are easy to con-
struct [30, 22, 3], and there are even universal adversarial
perturbations [19]. Adversarial examples are important for
practical reasons, because one can construct physical adver-
sarial examples, suggesting that neural networks in current
status are unusable in some image classification applica-
tions (e.g. imagine a small physical modification that could
reliably get a stop sign classified as a go faster sign [25, 16]).
Adversarial examples are important for conceptual reasons
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Figure 1: SafetyNet consists of a conventional classifier (in
our experiments, either VGG19 or ResNet) with an RBF-
SVM that uses discrete codes computed from late stage Re-
LUs to detect adversarial examples. We show that (a) Safe-
tyNet detects adversarial examples reliably, even if they are
produced by methods not represented in the detectors’ train-
ing set and (b) it is very difficult to produce examples that
are both misclassified and slip past SafetyNet’s detector.
too, because an explanation of why adversarial examples
are easy to construct could cast some light on the inner life
of neural networks. The absence of theory means it is hard
to defend against adversarial examples (for example, distil-
lation was proposed as a defense [26], but was later shown
to not work [2]).
Adversarial example constructions (e.g., line search
along the gradient [9]; LBFGS on an appropriate cost [30];
DeepFool [20]) all rely on the gradient of the network, but it
is known that using the gradient of another similar network
is sufficient [25], so concealing the gradient does not work
as a defense for current networks. An important puzzle is
that networks that generalize very well remain susceptible
to adversarial examples [30]. Another important puzzle is
that examples that are adversarial for one network tend to
be adversarial for another as well [30, 15, 27]. Some net-
work architectures appear to be robust to adversarial exam-
ples [13], which still need more empirical verification. At
least some adversarial attacks appear to apply to many dis-
tinct networks [19].
We denote the probability distribution of examples by
P (X). At least in the case of vision, P (X) has support on
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some complicated subset of the input space, which is known
as the “manifold” of “real images”. Nguyen et al. show how
to construct examples that appear to be noise, but are con-
fidently classified as objects [23]. This construction yields
a(x) lies outside the support of P (X), so the classifier’s la-
beling is unreliable because it has not seen such examples.
However, most adversarial examples “look like” images to
humans, such as figure 5 in [30], so they are likely to lie
within the support of P (X).
One way to build a network that is robust to adversarial
examples is to train networks with enhanced training data
(adding adversarial samples [18]); this approach faces diffi-
culties, because the dimension of the images and features in
networks means an unreasonable quantity of training data is
required. Alternatively, we can build a network that detects
and rejects an adversarial sample. Metzen et al. show that,
by attaching a detection subnetwork that observes the state
of the original classification network, one can tell whether it
has been presented with an adversarial example or not [17].
However, because the gradients of their detection subnet-
work are quite well behaved, the joint system can be at-
tacked (Type II attack) easily in both their and our experi-
ments. Both their and our experiments also show that their
detection subnetwork is easily fooled by adversarial sam-
ples produced by attacking methods which are not used in
detector training process.
Our method focuses on codes produced by quantizing
individual ReLUs in particular layers of the classification
network (“patterns of activation”), and proceed from the hy-
pothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Adversarial attacks work by producing dif-
ferent patterns of activation in late stage ReLUs to those
produced by natural examples.
These patterns lie outside the family for which the softmax
layer would be reliable. This hypothesis suggests that: (a)
the presence of an adversarial example can be detected (as
in Metzen et al. [17]); (b) such detectors can be made very
difficult to defeat (unlike Metzen et al. [17]; section 5); (c).
such detectors should be good at generalization for different
adversarial attacks (unlike Metzen et al. [17]); (d) transfer
attacks work because an example that generates unfamiliar
patterns in one network tends to generate unfamiliar pat-
terns in other networks too; (e) transfer attacks could be
defended as well (section 5).
Contributions: Section 2 describes our SafetyNet ar-
chitecture, which consists of the original classifier network
and a detector that rejects adversarial examples. A type I
attack on SafetyNet consists of a standard adversarial ex-
ample crafted to be (a) similar to a natural image; (b) mis-
classified by the original network. A type II attack consists
of an example that is crafted to be (a) similar to a natural
image; (b) misclassified; and (c) not rejected by SafetyNet.
We show that SafetyNet is robust to both types of attacks
and generalize well. Concealing the gradients is highly ef-
fective for SafetyNet, and it produces a black box that is
strongly resistant to the best attacks we have been able to
construct. This is in sharp contrast to all other known meth-
ods [25, 17].
In section 5, we demonstrate SceneProof, a robust and
reasonably effective proof that an image is an image of a
real scene (a “real” image; contrast a “fake” image, which
is not an image of a real scene). We identify images of real
scenes by checking a match between the image and a depth
map, which is hard to manipulate. We show that SceneProof
is (a) accurate and (b) strongly resistant to attacks that try to
get manipulated scenes identified as authentic scenes.
In section 6, we propose a model that explains why our
approach works, and it also demonstrates that SafetyNet is
difficult to attack in principle.
2. SafetyNet: Spotting Adversarial Examples
SafetyNet consists of the original classifier, and an ad-
versary detector which looks at the internal state of the later
layers in the original classifier, as in Figure 1. If the adver-
sary detector declares that an example is adversarial, then
the sample is rejected.
2.1. Detecting Adversarial Examples
The adversary detector needs to be hard to attack. We
force an attacker to solve a hard discrete optimization prob-
lem. For a layer of ReLUs at a high level in the classification
network, we quantize each ReLU at some set of thresholds
to generate a discrete code (binarized code in the case of one
threshold). Our hypothesis 1 suggests that different code
patterns appear for natural examples and adversarial exam-
ples. We use an adversary detector that compares a code
produced at test time with a collection of examples, mean-
ing that an attacker must make the network produce a code
that is acceptable to the detector (which is hard; section 5).
The adversary detector in SafetyNet uses an RBF-SVM on
binary or quaternary codes (activation patterns) to find ad-
versarial examples.
We denote a code by c. The RBF-SVM classifies by
f(c) =
N∑
i
αiyi exp(−||c− ci||2/2σ2) + b (1)
In this objective function, when σ is small, the detector pro-
duces essentially no gradient unless the attacking code c is
very close to a positive example ci. Our quantization pro-
cess makes the detector more robust and the gradients even
harder to get. Experiments show that this form of gradient
obfuscation is quite robust, and that confusing the detector
is very difficult without access to the RBF-SVM, and still
difficult even when access is possible. Experiments in sec-
tion 5 and theory in section 6 confirm that the optimization
problem is hard.
2.2. Attacking Methods
We use the following standard and strong attacks [2],
with various choice of hyper-parameters, to test the robust-
ness of the systems. Each attack searches for a nearby a(x)
which changes the class of the example and does not cre-
ate visual artifacts. We use these methods to produce both
type I attack (fool the classifier) and type II attack (fool the
classifier and sneak past the detector).
Fast Sign method: Goodfellow et al [9] described this
simple method. The applied perturbation is the direction in
image space which yields the highest increase of the lin-
earized cost under l∞ norm. It uses a hyper-parameter  to
govern the distance between adversarial and original image.
Iterative methods: Kurakin et al. [14] introduced an
iteration version of the fast sign method, by applying it sev-
eral times with a smaller step size α and clipping all pixels
after each iteration to ensure that results stay in the  neigh-
borhood of the original image. We apply two versions of
this method, one where the neighborhood is in L∞ norm
and another where it is in L2 norm.
DeepFool method: Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [20] in-
troduced the DeepFool adversary, which is able to choose
which class an example is switched to. DeepFool iteratively
perturbs an image xadv0 , linearizes the classifier around x
adv
n
and finds the closest class boundary. The minimal step ac-
cording to the lp distance from xadvn to traverse this class
boundary is determined and the resulting point is used as
xadvn+1. The algorithm stops once x
adv
n+1 changes the class of
the actual classifier. We use a powerful L2 version of Deep-
Fool.
Transfer method: Papernot et al. [25] described a way
to attack a black-box network. They generated adversarial
samples using another accessible network, which performs
the same task, and used these adversarial samples to attack
the black-box network. This strategy has been notably reli-
able.
2.3. Type I Attacks Are Detected
Accuracy: Our SafetyNet can detect adversarial sam-
ples with high accuracy on CIFAR-10 [12] and ImageNet-
1000 [4]. For classification networks, we used a 32-layer
ResNet [10] for CIFAR-10 and a VGG19 network [29] for
ImageNet-1000. Figures 2 shows the detection accuracy
of our Binarized RBF-SVM detector on the x5 layer of
ResNet for Cifar10 and on the fc7 layer of VGG19 trained
for ImageNet-1000. Adversarial samples are generated by
Iterative-L2, Iterative-Linf, DeepFool-L2 and FastSign
methods. Figure 2 compares our RBF-SVM detection re-
sults with the detector subnetwork results of [17]. The RoC
for our detector for Cifar-10 and ImageNet-1000 appears in
Figure 3.
Our results show: When our detector is tested on the
same adversary as it is trained on, its performance is simi-
lar to the detector subnetwork [17], even though our detec-
tor works on quantized activation patterns while the detec-
tor subnetwork works on original continuous activation pat-
terns. DeepFool is a strong attack. Increasing the number
of categories in the problem makes it easier for DeepFool to
produce an undetected adversarial example, likely because
it becomes easier to exploit local classification errors with-
out producing strange ReLU activations. If DeepFool is re-
quired to produce a label outside the top-5 for the original
example, the attack is much weaker.
Generalization across attacks: Generally, a detector
cannot know at training time what attacks will occur at test
time. We test generalization across attacks by training a de-
tector on one class of attack, then testing with other classes
of attack. Figure 2 shows that our RBF-SVM generalizes
across attacks more reliably than a detector subnetwork. We
believe this is because the representation presented to the
RBF-SVM has been aggressively summarized (by quanti-
zation), so that the classifier is not distracted by subtle but
irrelevant features. Note this kind of generalization is not
guaranteed just by using a neural network; for example, Ta-
ble 7 shows networks trained on normal quality JPEG im-
ages are confounded by low quality JPEG test images.
3. Rejecting by Classification Confidence
Our experiments demonstrate that there is a trade-off be-
tween classification confidence and detection easiness for
adversarial examples. Adversarial examples with high con-
fidence in wrong classification labels tend to have more ab-
normal activation patterns, so they are easier to be detected
by detectors. While adversarial examples with low clas-
sification confidence in wrong labels are harder to be de-
tected. For example, attacks like DeepFool add small and
just enough perturbations to change the classification label,
so these adversarial examples are sometimes hard to detect.
However, these adversarial examples could not assign high
classification confidence to the wrong label. If they perform
more iterations and increase the wrong class classification
confidence, our detector could detect them much easier.
Experiments also show that Type II attacks on our quan-
tized SVM detector together with the classifier produce ad-
versarial examples with low confidence. All these exper-
iments mean that we can use classification confidence as a
detection criteria, and it could help us increase the detector’s
detection ability and decrease the potential to be attacked by
Type II attacks.
The classification confidence in our experiments is mea-
sured by the ratio of the example’s second highest classifica-
tion confidence to the highest classification confidence. For
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Figure 2: SafetyNet accurately detects adversarial attacks. To facilitate comparison, we follow the conventions of [17],
plotting the success of the adversary (i.e. its ability to fool the classifier; leftward is better) on the horizontal axis and the
accuracy of the detector on the vertical axis (higher is better). We show results for binary (SVM) and quaternary (M-SVM)
codes, and for a variety of attacks. A: Results for the detection subnetwork on CIFAR-10 from [17]. B: Results for SafetyNet
on CIFAR-10, where the detector was trained and tested on adversarial samples generated by the same attacking method
(same setting as A). C: Results for SafetyNet and the detection subnetwork (cnn) of [17] on CIFAR-10, where the detector
was trained on L∞ attack and tested on other attacking methods; SafetyNet generalizes better than detection subnetwork to
different adversarial attacking methods. D: Results for SafetyNet on ImageNet-1000, where the detector was trained and
tested on the same adversarial method. The classifier is evaluated with top-5 accuracy (E is evaluated with top-1 accuracy,
note difference in x axis); using top-5 accuracy significantly advantages the adversary detector, because forcing an adversarial
example to move out of top-5 requires larger changes. F: Results for SafetyNet on ImageNet-1000 (top-5), where the detector
was trained on L∞ attack and tested on other attacking methods; SafetyNet has relatively small loss of detection accuracy
(compared to E). We cannot compare to the detection subnetwork of [17], because they do not provide results for ImageNet-
1000.
CIFAR-10 ImageNet-1000, top-1 ImageNet-1000, top-5
Figure 3: ROC curve for our adversary detector on various adversaries. Left: CIFAR-10; center: ImageNet-1000, top-1;
right: ImageNet-1000, top-5. Deepfool-5 is a variant of deepfool that is required to force the adversarial example out of the
original example’s top 5 classes. Deepfool is a strong adversarial attack, and seems to benefit from being able to choose the
target class from multiple classes.
Non Attack Type I Attack Type II Attack
Method F→T T→F T→T reject F→T T→F T→T reject F→T T→F T→T reject
Non Attack Data 9.7% 0% 9.4% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Unfamiliar Data Average 17.3% 0% 0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Gradient Descent Attack N/A N/A N/A 9.9% 5.0% 6.1% 16.3% 3.7% 6.2%
Transfer Attack Average N/A N/A N/A 4.6% 9.4% 33.6% 7.9% 9.8% 26.6%
Table 1: Summary of our fc7 RBF-SVM detector’s reaction on various non attack data and Type I, Type II attacks (smaller is
better). F→T means the rate at which false label images are classified as true and the detector does not spot, same for T→F.
T→T reject means the rate at which true label images are classified as true, however, they are rejected by the detector. This
number only matters for non attack data because attacks are likely to distort activation patterns even when the label keeps
same. As expected, Type I attacks are less successful than Type II attacks. This is because a Type I attack does not explicitly
try to fool the detector.
Type I Attack
True to False
Type I Attack
False to True
Image Depth Attacked Depth Depth Diff
Type II Attack
True to False
Type II Attack
False to True
Figure 4: We show figures for successful Type I attacks
(fool the classifier) on the original classifier network, and
successful Type II attacks (fool both the classifier and detec-
tor) on our SafetyNet. Attackers are only allowed to manip-
ulate the depth. Our SafetyNet is very difficult to attack and
attacks changing label from False to True is harder. Suc-
cessful attacks on our SafetyNet requires the original inputs
hard to classify and the attacks also need to manipulate the
images more.
example, if an image has 60% probability to be a dog and
15% probability to be a cat, our classification confidence
is 0.25. We reject examples with classification confidence
ratio bigger than a threshold, which means the classifier is
unsure about the classification.
The classification confidence rejection results for non at-
tack images and various Type II attack adversarial exam-
ples are included in Table 2 for Cifar-10 and Table 3 for
ImageNet-1000. Both tables show that rejecting by clas-
sification confidence rejects few non attack images while
hugely increase the rejection of Type II attack adversarial
examples. The benefits of rejecting by classification confi-
dence is also demonstrated in the Type II attacks section.
4. Type II Attacks fail
A type II attack involves a search for an adversarial ex-
ample that will be (a) mislabelled and (b) not detected. We
perform the gradient descent based Type II attacks for Cifar-
10 and ImageNet-1000 with SVM detector, and compare to
detection subnetwork [17]. Because the gradients of de-
tection subnetwork are better formed, it should be easier to
attack with Type II gradient descent attacks.
In our experiments for Cifar-10 and ImageNet-1000, we
use different gradient descent based Type II attacks (L0, L2,
Fast, DeepFool and top-5 DeepFool) to attack the detector
and classifier at the same time. In the main paper, gradient
descent based Type II attacks on SceneProof dataset use L2
LBFGS method.
The summary for Type II attacks on Cifar-10 could be
found in Table 4. The numbers reported in the table are the
percentages of adversarial examples that are both misclassi-
fied and undetected (lower is better). Without classification
confidence rejection, quantized SVM detector and detection
subnetwork perform similar under Type II attacks for L0, L2
and Fast methods, and quantized SVM detector performs
significantly better under DeepFool Type II attacks. With
classification confidence rejection, quantized SVM detec-
tor is very hard to attack and performs better than detection
subnetwork on almost all attacking methods. The classifi-
cation confidence rejection increases at maximum 7% false
rejection on non attack images. The detailed percentages of
Type II attacks on Cifar-10 could be found in Table 10.
The summary for Type II attacks on ImageNet-1000
could be found in Table 5.The table arrangement is same
to Table 4, and DeepFool5 is top-5 DeepFool attack. Quan-
tized SVM detector consistently performs better than de-
tection subnetwork for various attacking methods and for
both with classification confidence rejection and without.
It’s very difficult to perform Type II attacks on quantized
Statistics Non Attack L0 (II) L2 (II) Fast (II) DeepFool (II)
Mean-confident 95.45% 73.95% 69.36% 74.73% 73.71%
m-SVM Det Mean-ratio 0.05 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.36
Rejection-rate 7.22% 43.58% 53.96% 45.46% 63.22%
Mean-confident 95.45% 95.71% 96.68% 79.21% 73.72%
Subnet Det Mean-ratio 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.36
Rejection-rate 7.22% 3.98% 5.50% 37.73% 63.22%
Table 2: CIFAR-10 classification confidence rejection results on non attack images, and various gradient descent based Type
II attack adversarial examples. Mean-confident is the mean of classification confidence for the label with highest probability.
Mean-ratio is the mean of the ratio of the second highest predicted label confidence to the highest predicted label confidence.
Rejection-rate is the rate that examples are rejected because the ratio is higher than the threshold. The ratio for Cifar-10 is
0.25, which means the first predicted label confidence must be four times higher than the second one. For non attack data,
the classification confidence rejection only rejects small amount of examples; for quantized SVM detector, it rejects majority
of Type II attack adversarial examples; for detection subnetwork, the rejection is not as efficient as quantized SVM detector,
because getting high classification confidence while fooling detection subnetwork is easier (compared to quantized SVM
detector).
Statistics Non Attack L0 (II) L2 (II) Fast (II) DeepFool (II) DeepFool5 (II)
Mean-confident 81.55% 76.80% 41.25% 40.64% 43.93% 37.83%
m-SVM Det Mean-ratio 0.15 0.17 0.43 0.49 0.77 0.51
Rejection-rate 10.98% 14.26% 43.89% 49.55% 95.51% 51.90%
Mean-confident 81.55% 67.53% 67.13% 36.65% 43.93% 37.82%
Subnet Det Mean-ratio 0.15 0.28 0.30 0.51 0.77 0.51
Rejection-rate 10.98% 25.21% 28.55% 51.80% 95.51% 51.84%
Table 3: ImageNet-1000 classification confidence rejection results on non attack images, and various gradient descent based
Type II attack adversarial examples. The table arrangement is same to Table 2, and DeepFool5 is top-5 DeepFool. The
rejection ratio threshold is 0.5. For non attack data, the classification confidence rejection only rejects small amount of
examples; for quantized SVM detector and detection subnetwork, they reject majority of Type II attack adversarial examples.
SVM detector with rejection. The classification confidence
rejection increases at maximum 10% false rejection on non
attack images. The detailed percentages of Type II attacks
on ImageNet-1000 could be found in Table 11.
5. Application: SceneProof
SceneProof is a model application of our SafetyNet, be-
cause it would not work with a network that is subject to ad-
versarial examples. We would like Alice to be able to prove
to Bob that her photo is real without the intervention of a
team of experts, and we’d like Bob to have high confidence
in the proof. This proof needs to operate at large scales (i.e.
anyone could produce a proof while taking a picture), and
automatically.
Current best methods to identify fake images require
careful analysis of vanishing points [8], illumination an-
gles [6], and shadows [11] (reviews in [8, 7]). Such anal-
yses are difficult to conduct at large scales or automati-
cally. RGB image editing is easy, with very powerful tools
available. We construct a proof by capturing an RGBD im-
age (easily accessible with consumer depth sensors), which
changes the security aspect because it’s quite hard to edit
a depth map convincingly and those edits need to be con-
sistent with the image. The proof of realness is achieved
by a classifier that checks both image and depth and deter-
mines whether they are consistent. Such a system works
if (a) the classifier is acceptably accurate (i.e. it can deter-
mine whether the pair is real or not accurately); (b) it can
detect a variety of adversarial manipulations of depth or im-
age or both (i.e. type I attacks fail) ; and (c) type II attacks
generally fail. We achieve this by using the SafetyNet ar-
chitecture.
We are mainly concerned with attacks label “fake” im-
ages “real”. Natural attacks on our system are: produce a
depth map for an RGB image using some regression method
to obtain an RGBD image (regression); manipulate RGBD
image by inserting new objects; take an RGBD image la-
beled “fake” and manipulate it to be labeled “real” (type I
adversarial); take an RGBD image labeled “fake” and ma-
nipulate it to be labeled “real” in a way that fools Safe-
tyNet’s adversary detector (type II adversarial). There is a
wide range of available regression/adversarial attacks, and
Method L0 (II) L2 (II) Fast (II) DeepFool (II)
m-SVM Det 19.73 18.70 6.86 22.01
m-SVM Det - R 9.86 7.32 3.41 8.32
Subnet Det 20.73 12.30 1.89 96.24
Subnet Det - R 19.69 11.57 1.19 35.39
Table 4: Percentages of CIFAR-10 Type II attack adversarial examples that are both misclassified and undetected, lower is
better. - R means classification confidence rejection is used (rejection ratio is 0.25), otherwise only the detector is on duty.
Without classification confidence rejection, quantized SVM detector and detection subnetwork perform similar under Type
II attacks for L0, L2 and Fast methods, and quantized SVM detector performs significantly better under DeepFool Type II
attacks. With classification confidence rejection, quantized SVM detector is hard to attack and performs better than detection
subnetwork on almost all attacking methods.
Method L0 (II) L2 (II) Fast (II) DeepFool (II) DeepFool5 (II)
m-SVM Det 25.15 26.40 12.97 45.26 30.08
m-SVM Det - R 23.19 15.05 8.26 2.32 15.52
Subnet Det 70.52 36.43 21.25 100.00 42.24
Subnet Det - R 52.56 26.66 12.16 4.49 21.99
Table 5: Percentages of IMAGENET-1000 Type II attack adversarial examples that are misclassified and undetected, lower
is better. - R means classification confidence rejection is used (rejection ratio is 0.5), otherwise only the detector is on duty.
Quantized SVM detector consistently performs better than detection subnetwork for various attacking methods and for both
with classification confidence rejection and without. It is difficult to perform Type II attacks on quantized SVM detector with
rejection.
our system needs to be robust to various methods which
might be used to prepare the regression/adversarial attack.
Real test data is easily obtained. We use the raw
Kinect captures of LivingRoom and Bedroom from NYU
v2 dataset [21]. However, fake data requires care. To evalu-
ate generalization over different attacks, we omit some “re-
gression” methods from the training data and use them only
in test. “Regression” methods used in both train and test
are: random swaps of depth and image planes; single im-
age predicted depth [5]; rectangle cropped region insertion
and random shifted or scaled misaligned depth and image.
“Regression” methods used only in test are: all zero depth
values; nearest neighbor down-sample and up-sampled im-
ages and depths; low quality JPEG compressed images and
depths; Middlebury stereo RGBD dataset [28] and Sintel
RGBD dataset [1](which should be classified “fake” be-
cause they are renderings). Refer to Figure 4 for dataset
and attacks.
Type I attacks on SafetyNet fail: Type I attacks on
SceneProof using a familiar adversary (i.e. one used to train
the detector) fail. We report results for two detectors A (ap-
plied to fc7 of VGG19) and B (applied to fc6 of VGG19) in
Table 6. Type I attacks on SceneProof using an unfamiliar
adversary (i.e. one not used to train the detector) generally
fail. We report results for two detectors A (applied to fc7 of
VGG19) and B (applied to fc6 of VGG19) in Table 7.
A type II attack must both fool the classifier and sneak
past the detector. We distinguish between two conditions.
In non-blackbox case, the internals of the SafetyNet system
is accessible to the attacker. Alternatively, the network may
be a black box, with internal states and gradients concealed.
In this case, attackers must probe with inputs and gather
outputs, or build another approximate network as in [25].
Type II attacks on accessible SafetyNet fail: a type
II attack involves a search for an adversarial example that
will be (a) mislabelled and (b) not detected. This search
is made difficult by the quantization procedure and by the
narrow basis functions in the RBF-SVM, so we smooth
the quantization operation and the RBF-SVM kernel oper-
ation. Smoothing is essential to make the search tractable,
but can significantly misapproximate SafetyNet (which is
what makes attacks hard). Our smoothing attack uses a sig-
moid function with parameter λ to simulate the quantization
process. We also help the search process by increasing the
size of the RBF parameter σ to form smoother gradients.
Even after smoothing the objective function, attacks tend to
fail, likely because it is hard to make an effective tradeoff
between easy search and approximation. Table 8 includes
Type I and Type II, blackbox and non-blackbox attacking
results on SceneProof dataset. Our SafetyNet is the most
robust architecture to various attacks.
Type II attacks on black box SafetyNet fail: Assume
the state of SafetyNet is concealed. We follow [24, 19] by
building attacks on various alternative networks, then trans-
Test example type Classifier Acc B A B ∧ A A∨B A∨B, T
Natural RGBD, False 91.8% 15.2% 17.1% 14.3% 18.8% 19.6%
Natural RGBD, True 97.7% 10.1% 11.6% 9.2% 12.7% 10.8%
Adversarial RGBD, False 33.1% 89.1% 88.6% 87.3% 90.4% 88.9%
Adversarial RGBD, True 15.3% 81.3% 81.0% 79.1% 83.3% 83.7%
Table 6: This table shows detailed information about behavior of classifiers and detectors, summarized in Table 1. In this
table, results are calculated on the whole SceneProof dataset testing split. Type I attacks on SceneProof using a familiar
adversary (i.e. one used to train the detector) fail. We report results for two detectors: A is applied to fc7 of VGG19;
B is applied to fc6 of VGG19. Each detector column gives the rate at which the detector labels examples as adversarial.
A∨B means the example is reported adversarial if either detector says it is adversarial. A∧B means the example is reported
adversarial if both detectors say it is adversarial. A∨B, T gives the fraction of examples that were detected as adversarial
among these that were labelled True by the classifier. We break out results by type and ground truth label. For example,
for natural RGBD images that do not represent real scenes (first row), the classifier labels 91.8% correctly; of the 8.2%
incorrectly labelled true, the A∨B adversary detector rejects 19.6% as adversarial examples (last column).
Test example type Classifier Acc B A B ∧ A A∨B A∨B,T
zero D channel 76.5% 6.5% 25.6% 6.1% 26.0% 82.0%
down-up sampled 75.2% 54.9% 60.6% 51.3% 63.4% 87.6%
low quality JPEG 36.4% 80.1% 79.2% 77.2% 82.2% 81.8%
Sintel RGBD [1] 27.6% 45.3% 51.7% 39.7% 57.2% 61.4%
Middlebury RGBD [28] 24.0% 39.7% 40.3% 33.4% 46.6% 47.8%
Table 7: This table shows detailed information about behavior of classifiers and detectors, summarized in Table 1. The table
arrangement is same to Table 6. Type I attacks on SceneProof using an unfamiliar adversary (i.e. one not used to train the
detector) generally fail. All these examples should be labelled false, OR rejected as adversarial. The column for each detector
reports the rate at which the detector identifies examples as adversarial. For example, in the first row, 76.5% of zero D channel
RGBD images are correctly labelled as false by the classifier; of those labelled “true”, 82.0% are rejected as adversarial (last
column). This means that a total of 4.2% of zero D channel RGBD images pass through SafetyNet with “true” labels.
ferring these network’s adversarial samples. These attacks
fail for our SafetyNet, refer to Table 8. In contrast to Safe-
tyNet, the detector subnetwork of [17] is generally suscep-
tible to type II attacks in both blackbox and non-blackbox
settings. This is because of quantization process and detec-
tion subnetwork’s classification boundary problem [19].
6. Theory: Bars and P-domains
We construct one possible explanation for adversarial ex-
amples that successfully explains (a) the phenomenology
and (b) why SafetyNet works. In this explanation, we as-
sume the network uses ReLU and weight decay, because
they are representative, make it easier to explain, and likely
to extend to other conditions with some modifications. We
have a network withN layers of ReLU’s, and study y(k)i (x),
the values at the output of the k’th layer of ReLUs. This is a
piecewise linear function of x. Such functions break up the
input space into cells, at whose boundaries the piecewise
linear function changes (i.e. is only C0). Now assume that
for some y(k)i (x) there exist p-domains (union of cells) D
in the input space such that: (a) there are no or few exam-
ples in the p-domain; (b) the measure of D under P (X) is
small; (c) |y(k)i (x) | is large inside D and small outside D.
We will always use the term “p-domain” to refer to domains
with these properties. We think that the total measure of all
p-domains under P (X) is small.
By construction, ReLU networks can represent such p-
domains. We construct a p-domain using a basis function
with small support. R(u) denote a ReLU applied to u. We
have basic bar function φ.
φ(x; i, s, ) =
1

 R((xi − s) + )−2R((xi − s))+
R((xi − s)− )

where φ has support when |xi − s | <  and has peak value
1. For an index set I with cardinality #I and vectors s, ,
we write bar function b as
b(x; I, s, ) = R(
(∑
i∈I
φ(x; i, si, i)−#I + 1
)
)
where b has support when ||xI − sI ||1 < I . Figure 5 il-
lustrates these functions. It is clear that a CNN can encode
bars and weighted sums of bars, and that for at least k ≥ 2
every y(k)i could in principle be a bar function. Appropriate
Method Ori Subnet Det Det A Det ABC
F→T T→F F→T T→F T→T reject F→T T→F T→T reject F→T T→F T→T reject
Non Attack Data 16.3% 0.6% 8.4% 0% 10.2% 9.7% 0% 9.4% 8.4% 0% 9.9%
Gradient Descent (I) 32.8% 55.3% 13.4% 9.5% 6.0% 9.9% 5.0% 6.1% 8.4% 0.3% 6.3%
VGG FastSign TF (I) 30.6% 2.8% 14.9% 2.2% 54.1% 7.5% 2.5% 44.1% 6.6% 1.9% 47.2%
ResNet GradDesc TF (I) 28.9% 36.7% 15.3% 22.4% 33.2% 3.6% 13.4% 29.1% 2.7% 11.9% 30.3%
ResNet FastSign TF (I) 22.2% 29.1% 7.6% 15.1% 29.8% 2.8% 12.2% 27.5% 2.2% 11.6% 27.8%
Type I Average 28.6% 30.9% 12.8% 12.3% 30.8% 6.0% 8.3% 26.7% 5.0% 6.4% 27.9%
Gradient Descent (II) 32.8% 55.3% 26.3% 21.9% 11.9% 16.3% 3.7% 6.2% 13.2% 2.6% 9.6%
VGG Finetune TF (II) 20% 3.1% 17.1% 0% 43.5% 17.2% 0% 45.6% 17.2% 0% 48.4%
VGG Subnet Det TF (II) 16.3% 0.6% 13.7% 0% 15.6% 10.3% 0% 12.5% 9.1% 0% 13.1%
ResNet Finetune TF (II) 15.6% 40.3% 8.5% 31.3% 29.3% 1.3% 27.2% 20.6% 0.3% 25% 21.0%
ResNet Subnet Det TF (II) 23.8% 29.7% 17.6% 19.3% 29.8% 2.8% 12.2% 27.5% 2.2% 11.6% 27.5%
Type II Average 21.7% 25.8% 16.6% 14.5% 26.0% 9.6% 8.6% 22.5% 8.4% 7.84% 23.9%
Table 8: Type I and Type II attacks, non-blackbox and blackbox attacks on SceneProof all fail. This table is gather by
attacking a randomly selected subset of 3200 images from the whole SceneProof dataset test split (contains 80K images).
The table compares a VGG19 network (Ori) with the detection subnetwork of [17] (Subnet), and two variants of SafetyNet
(Det A, where we have an RBF-SVM on fc7; and Det ABC, where we have an RBF-SVM on each of fc7, fc6 and pool5,
and declare an adversary when any detector responds). T→F shows the rate at which true label classified as false and not
detected and F→T shows false label classified as true and not detected (i.e. lower is better). T→T reject shows the rate
at which true samples are classified as true, but rejected by detector. This rate only matters for non attack data, and does
not matter for all attacks because attacks are likely to distort the activation patterns even if the classification label has not
been changed. There is no manipulation for the non attack data, which represents unforced errors by the classifier; note that
each of the adversary detectors catches a high percentage of the false positives committed by the classifier and rejects them
as adversarial. We group attacks by type I attack (I) and type II attack (II). The gradient descent shows the performance
of an attack by gradient descent method (type I or type II) on an accessible network. Even when the network is accessible,
attacks tend to be unsuccessful. TF represents blackbox transfer attacks where adversarial samples are obtrained from another
network (VGG - a VGG19 model; ResNet - a ResNet model). The VGG19 (ResNet) FastSign TF gives results for a type I
attack by transferring FastSign adversarials from a VGG19 (ResNet) model. VGG (ResNet) Finetune TF finetunes a VGG19
(ResNet) network with adversarial examples labelled false, and generate adversarials; VGG (ResNet) Subnet Det TF uses a
VGG19 (ResNet) network with the detection subnetwork of [17]. The results show that original classifier network is easy
to attack successfully with all attacking methods. Subnet methods can detect type I attacks, but are not robust to transfer
attacks and are vulnerable to type II attacks. Our SafetyNet is robust to Type I and Type II attacks, as well as gradient descent
and transfer attacks, likely because: quantization hides irrelevant patterns; SafetyNet works like a matcher, so is hard to
differentiate; and the subnetwork suffers from the classification boundary problem noted in [19].
choices of s,  and I choose the location and support of the
bar and so can produce bars which have low measure under
P (X). Now the functions presented to the softmax layer
are a linear combination of the y(N)i (x). This means that
with choice of weight and parameters, a bar can appear at
this level, and create a p-domain.
Figure 5: Simple example bar functions on the x, y plane,
where black is 0 and white is 1. Left: φ(x; 1, 0, 1) (i.e. a
bar in x, independent of y); center: φ(x; 2, 0, 1); and right:
b(x; {1, 2} ,0, 1).
We expect such p-domains to have several important
properties. Adversarial fertility: P-domains can be used
to make adversarial examples by choosing a point in a p-
domain close to x. Because there are no or few exam-
ples in the p-domain, the loss may not cause the classi-
fier to control the maximum value attained by y(k)i (x) in
this p-domain; and the large range of values inside the
p-domain can be used to change the values in layers up-
stream of k, by moving the example around the p-domain.
Generalization-neutral: The requirement that p-domains
have small measure in P (X) means that both train and
test examples are highly unlikely to lie in p-domains. A
system with p-domains could generalize well without be-
ing immune to adversarial examples. Some subset of p-
domains are likely findable by LBFGS. Consider the gra-
dient of y(N)i (x) with respect to x in two cells separated by
a boundary, where some ReLU changes state, weight de-
cay encourages a relatively small change in gradient over
these boundaries. If cells neighboring a p-domain have no
or few examples in them, we can expect that the gradient
change within cell is small too and a second order approx-
imation of y(N)i (x) could be reliable. We also expect cells
to be small, so search and entering a p-domain are possi-
ble and requires crossing multiple cell boundaries, which
means many changes in ReLU activation. This argument
suggests p-domains present odd patterns of ReLU activa-
tion, particularly in p-domains where some of the y(k)i (x)
are large in the absence of examples.
Why p-domains could exist: As Zhang et al. point out,
the number of training examples available to a typical mod-
ern network is small compared to the relative capacity of
deep networks [31]. For example, excellent training error is
obtainable for randomly chosen image labels [31]. We ex-
pect that y(N)i (x) will have a number of cells that is expo-
nential in the dimension of x, ensuring that the vast majority
of cells lack any example. However, the weight decay term
is not sufficient to ensure that y(N)i is zero in these cells.
Overshoot by stochastic gradient descent, caused by poor
scaling in the loss, is the likely reason that y(N)i (x) has sup-
port in these cells. Szegedy et al. demonstrate that, in prac-
tice, ReLU layers can have large norm as linear operators,
despite weight decay (see [30], sec. 4.3), so large values
in p-domains are plausible. This large norm is likely to be
the result of overshoot. Recall that the value of y(N)i (x) is
determined by the product of numerous weights, so in some
locations in x, the value of y(N)i could be large, which is a
result of multiple layer norms interacting poorly.
An alternative to attacking by search using smoothed
RBF gradients is as follows. One might pass an example
through the main classifier, determine what code it had, then
seek an adversarial example that produces that code (and
so must fool the RBF-SVM). We sketch a proof that the
optimization problem is extremely difficult. Choose some
threshold t > 0. We use bt(u) for the function that bina-
rizes its argument with t. Assume we have at least one unit
y
(k)
i that encodes a weighted sum of bar functions. We wish
to create an adversarial example a(x∗) that (a) meets cri-
teria for being adversarial and (b) ensures that bt(y
(k)
i (a))
takes a prescribed value (either one or zero). The feasible
set for this constraint can be disconnected (e.g. a sum of the
bump functions of Figure 5 (right)), and so need not be con-
vex, implying that the optimization problem is intractable.
As a simple example, the following constraint set is discon-
nected for  < 1/2
{x | bt(b(x; 1,0, ) + b(x; 1,1, )) = 1} .
7. Discussion
We have described a method to produce a classifier that
identifies and rejects adversarial examples. Our SafetyNet
is able to reject adversarial examples that come from attack-
ing methods not seen in training data. We have shown that
it is hard to produce an example that (a) is mislabeled and
(b) is not detected as adversarial by SafetyNet. We have
sketched one possible reason that SafetyNet works, and is
hard to attack. Many interesting problems are opened by
our work, and we provides lots of insights into the mecha-
nism that neural network works.
SaferNet: There might be some better architecture than
our SafetyNet, whose objective function is harder to opti-
mize. The ideal case would be an architecture that forces
the attacker to solve a hard discrete optimization problem
which does not naturally admit smoothing.
Neural network pruning: Our work suggests that net-
works behave poorly for input space regions where no data
has been seen. We speculate that this behavior could be
discouraged by a post-training pruning process, which re-
moves neurons, paths or activation patterns not touched by
training data.
Explicit management of overshoot during training:
we have explained adversarial examples using p-domains,
which is the result of poor damping of weights during train-
ing. We speculate that constructing adversarial examples
during training, by identifying locations where this damping
problem occurs and exploiting structural insights into net-
work behavior, could control the adversarial sample prob-
lem (rather than just using adversarial examples as training
data).
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9. Supporting Materials
9.1. SceneProof Dataset
Our SceneProof dataset is processed from NYU Depth
v2 raw captures, Sintel Synthetic RGBD dataset and Mid-
dlebury Stereo dataset. The dataset is split into part I and
part II. Part I contains NYU natural image & depth pairs,
along with manipulated unnatural scenes (swap depth, in-
sert region, predicted depth, scale & shift depth), refer to
Figure 6. It is used to train our classifier and work as test
data part I. Part II contains unnatural scenes manipulated
by other methods (set depth channel to zero, down sam-
ple and then up-sample both RGBD channels, aggressively
compress the JPG RGBD images), and image & depth pairs
from synthetic dataset and stereo dataset, refer to Figure 7.
Part II is used as test data part II to test the generalization
ability of our SceneProof network, and check the reactions
of our detectors to unseen unnatural inputs. A good detector
need to tend to reject unfamiliar data type, which does not
exist in training data, because it is hard for classifier to do
right classifications on unseen data types. In real applica-
tion scenarios, it needs to be a human computer hybrid sys-
tem where computer provides suspicious cases and human
makes final decisions. Table 9 includes the dataset constitu-
tion, and we plan to release the dataset for academia usages.
9.2. Type II Attacks on Cifar-10 and ImageNet-1000
In this section, we include the detailed percentages of
Type II attacks on Cifar-10 could be found in Table 10, and
the detailed percentages of Type II attacks on ImageNet-
1000 could be found in Table 11.
Training Testing I Testing II
Natural Scene 141780 57542 N/A
Swap Depth 33927 16094 N/A
Insert Region 30426 13741 N/A
Predicted Depth 53904 17026 N/A
Scale&Shift Depth 23523 10681 N/A
zeroD channel N/A N/A 1449
down-up sampled N/A N/A 1449
low quality JPG N/A N/A 1449
Sintel RGBD N/A N/A 54
Middlebury RGBD N/A N/A 30
Total 283560 115084 4431
Table 9: Number of image & depth pairs for each data type
in each dataset split. Natural Scene has true label and the
other data types have false labels.
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Figure 6: SceneProof dataset part I. Natural Scene has true label, and others have false labels.
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Figure 7: SceneProof dataset part II. All have false labels.
